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Truth, Rightness, and Permanent Acceptability
Vol. 95, No. 1, Probing into "Reconceptions" (Apr., 1993), pp. 107-117
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20117768
Page Count: 11
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Goodman and Elgin want truth to be demoted and rightness to be promoted. In the first part of this paper the main reasons they offer for this reorientation are discussed. Goodman once suggested that one construe truth as acceptability that is not subsequently lost, but later he quietly dropped this proposal. In the second part of this paper it is argued that ultimate acceptability is indeed neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for truth.
Synthese © 1993 Springer