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Physicalism, Qualia Inversion, and Affective States

Neil Campbell
Synthese
Vol. 124, No. 2 (Aug., 2000), pp. 239-255
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20118309
Page Count: 17
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Physicalism, Qualia Inversion, and Affective States
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Abstract

I argue that the inverted spectrum hypothesis is not a possibility we should take seriously. The principle reason is that if someone's qualia were inverted in the specified manner there is reason to believe the phenomenal difference would manifest itself in behaviour. This is so for two reasons. First, I suggest that qualia, including phenomenal colours, are partly constituted by an affective component which would be inverted along with the connected qualia. The resulting affective inversions will, given the intimate connections that exist between emotions and behaviour, likely manifest themselves in behaviour, in which case the underlying phenomenal differences can be functionally captured. Second, I argue that other sense modalities lack the structural features necessary for undetectable inversion which, because of their analogy with colour qualia, weakens the plausibility of such an inversion in the original case of vision.

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