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Psychologism and Metalogic

Jan Woleński
Synthese
Vol. 137, No. 1/2, History of Logic (Nov., 2003), pp. 179-193
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20118357
Page Count: 15
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Psychologism and Metalogic
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Abstract

This paper examines two arguments against psychologism advanced by Frege and Husserl. The first argument says that the laws of logic cannot be justified by the laws of psychology, because the former and a priori and certain, but the latter are probable only. The second argument points out that the status of logical laws as universal principles of thinking is not intelligible on the psychologistic interpretation of logic. The author tries to show how to examine both arguments by metalogical devices.

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