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Psychologism and Metalogic
Vol. 137, No. 1/2, History of Logic (Nov., 2003), pp. 179-193
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20118357
Page Count: 15
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Cognitive psychology, Mathematical psychologism, Philosophical psychology, Truth, Logical theorems, Logic, Normativity, Logical empiricism, Psychology, Metalogic
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This paper examines two arguments against psychologism advanced by Frege and Husserl. The first argument says that the laws of logic cannot be justified by the laws of psychology, because the former and a priori and certain, but the latter are probable only. The second argument points out that the status of logical laws as universal principles of thinking is not intelligible on the psychologistic interpretation of logic. The author tries to show how to examine both arguments by metalogical devices.
Synthese © 2003 Springer