Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

The No Probabilities for Acts-Principle

Marion Ledwig
Synthese
Vol. 144, No. 2, Knowledge, Rationality & Action (Mar., 2005), pp. 171-180
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20118557
Page Count: 10
  • Download ($43.95)
  • Cite this Item
If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
The No Probabilities for Acts-Principle
Preview not available

Abstract

One can interpret the No Probabilities for Acts-Principle, namely that any adequate quantitative decision model must in no way contain subjective probabilities for actions in two ways: it can either refer to actions that are performable now and extend into the future or it can refer to actions that are not performable now, but will be in the future. In this paper, I will show that the former is the better interpretation of the principle.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[171]
    [171]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
172
    172
  • Thumbnail: Page 
173
    173
  • Thumbnail: Page 
174
    174
  • Thumbnail: Page 
175
    175
  • Thumbnail: Page 
176
    176
  • Thumbnail: Page 
177
    177
  • Thumbnail: Page 
178
    178
  • Thumbnail: Page 
179
    179
  • Thumbnail: Page 
180
    180