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Knowledge's Boundary Problem
Vol. 150, No. 1 (May, 2006), pp. 41-56
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20118757
Page Count: 16
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Justified beliefs, Fallibilism, Epistemology, Belief, Epistemic justification, Epistemological contextualism, Minimalism, Intuition, Truth, Foundationalism
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Where is the justificatory boundary between a true belief's not being knowledge and its being knowledge? Even if we put to one side the Gettier problem, this remains a fundamental epistemological question, concerning as it does the matter of whether we can provide some significant defence of the usual epistemological assumption that a belief is knowledge only if it is well justified. But can that question be answered non-arbitrarily? BonJour believes that it cannot be -- and that epistemology should therefore abandon the concept of knowledge. More optimistically, this paper does attempt to answer that question, by applying -- and thereby refining -- a non-absolutist theory of knowledge.
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