Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

Mao and Agriculture in China's Industrialization: Three Antitheses in a 50-Year Perspective

Y. Y. Kueh
The China Quarterly
No. 187 (Sep., 2006), pp. 700-723
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192660
Page Count: 24
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Mao and Agriculture in China's Industrialization: Three Antitheses in a 50-Year Perspective
Preview not available

Abstract

Accelerated agricultural collectivization in China was an inescapable consequence of the broader economic goal of socialist industrialization. Rightly or wrongly, this wider vision of China's future was imposed by Mao, and to judge the High Tide of agricultural collectivization of 1955-56 without regard to these wider objectives is a mistake. The collectivization represented an extensive growth that relied on labour mobilization to expand factor supply and to extend the crop sown area in a manner rationalized by the theories of Ragnar Nurkse. This strategy inevitably required bureaucratic control and coercion, depressed peasant consumption and the forced siphoning off of the agricultural surplus. As such its outcome should not be evaluated in terms of the neoclassical economic norms of income maximization, peasant incentives or efficiency in cropping patterns based on market prices. In this framework, the post-Mao decollectivization and the readjustment of the agriculture--industry balance can be seen as a transition to an intensive agricultural growth strategy that was built upon the precise material legacy (expanded irrigation and drainage capacity) left behind by Mao. This strategy has proved to be remarkably successful in further releasing industrial growth from the agricultural constraint.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[700]
    [700]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
701
    701
  • Thumbnail: Page 
702
    702
  • Thumbnail: Page 
703
    703
  • Thumbnail: Page 
704
    704
  • Thumbnail: Page 
705
    705
  • Thumbnail: Page 
706
    706
  • Thumbnail: Page 
707
    707
  • Thumbnail: Page 
708
    708
  • Thumbnail: Page 
709
    709
  • Thumbnail: Page 
710
    710
  • Thumbnail: Page 
711
    711
  • Thumbnail: Page 
712
    712
  • Thumbnail: Page 
713
    713
  • Thumbnail: Page 
714
    714
  • Thumbnail: Page 
715
    715
  • Thumbnail: Page 
716
    716
  • Thumbnail: Page 
717
    717
  • Thumbnail: Page 
718
    718
  • Thumbnail: Page 
719
    719
  • Thumbnail: Page 
720
    720
  • Thumbnail: Page 
721
    721
  • Thumbnail: Page 
722
    722
  • Thumbnail: Page 
723
    723