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Why No "Efficient Breach" in the Civil Law?: A Comparative Assessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract

Ronald J. Scalise Jr.
The American Journal of Comparative Law
Vol. 55, No. 4 (Fall, 2007), pp. 721-766
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20454595
Page Count: 46
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Why No "Efficient Breach" in the Civil Law?: A Comparative Assessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract
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Abstract

The aim of this article is to evaluate the American theory of "efficient breach" of contract, long heralded by the proponents of the law and economics movement, as a civil law scholar would do in his own jurisdiction. Because of a number of cultural and doctrinal hurdles that stand in the way of judicial and scholarly recognition of the theory, civilian jurisdictions are less favorable for the existence and development of the doctrine of efficient breach than American law is. By identifying and discussing these hurdles, this article attempts to make the scholarship of both economists and comparativists more relevant to each other by contributing to the dialogue between the two.

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