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Identity and Indiscernibility

Katherine Hawley
Mind
New Series, Vol. 118, No. 469 (Jan., 2009), pp. 101-119
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20532734
Page Count: 19
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Identity and Indiscernibility
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Abstract

Putative counterexamples to the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) are notoriously inconclusive. I establish ground rules for debate in this area, offer a new response to such counterexamples for friends of the PII, but then argue that no response is entirely satisfactory. Finally, I undermine some positive arguments for PII.

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