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Rigidity and Essentiality: Reply to Gómez-Torrente

Arif Ahmed
Mind
New Series, Vol. 118, No. 469 (Jan., 2009), pp. 121-133
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20532735
Page Count: 13
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Rigidity and Essentiality: Reply to Gómez-Torrente
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Abstract

Mario Gómez-Torrente (2006) says that whilst theoretical identifications (e.g. 'All lightning is electrical discharge') do not entail their own necessitations, they do entail the necessitation of a weaker statement. And he claims that this weaker entailment serves Kripke's purposes as well as the stronger one would have. I argue that this is false. Section 1 says what the weaker entailment is; section 2 says why it matters. Section 3 argues that the entailment identified at section 1 does not meet the purpose identified at section 2. Section 4 rejects two possible objections. The aim is to illustrate (not establish) the general claim that those 'modal facts' that are not entirely speculative are quite useless.

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