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Rationality, Normativity, and Transparency
New Series, Vol. 118, No. 470 (Apr., 2009), pp. 353-367
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20532765
Page Count: 15
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Normativity, Reason, Rationality, Bridges, Cheating, Propositional attitudes, Psychological attitudes, Visual perception, Syntactical antecedents, Empiricism
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Although in everyday life and thought we take for granted that there are norms of rationality, their existence presents severe philosophical problems. Kolodny (2005) is thus moved to deny that rationality is normative. But this denial is not itself unproblematic, and I argue that Kolodny's defence of it--particularly his Transparency Account, which aims to explain why rationality appears to be normative even though it is not--is unsuccessful.
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