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Reply to Bridges

Niko Kolodny
Mind
New Series, Vol. 118, No. 470 (Apr., 2009), pp. 369-376
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20532766
Page Count: 8
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Reply to Bridges
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Abstract

Bridges (2009) argues that the 'Transparency Account' (TA) of Kolodny 2005 has a hidden flaw. The TA does not, after all, account for the fact that (1) in our ordinary, engaged thought and talk about rationality; we believe that, when it would be irrational of one of us to refuse to A, he has, because of this, conclusive reason to A. My reply is that this was the point. For reasons given in Kolodny 2005, (1) is false. The aim of the TA is to offer an interpretation of our engaged thought and talk that is compatible with the falsity of (1) and that helps to explain why, when reflecting on our thought and talk, we are so prone to misrepresent what it involves. After making these points, I consider alternative senses in which rationality might be, or be taken by us to be, 'normative' and conclude that these alternatives have little bearing on the TA.

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