Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

Conjecture, Probabilism, and Provisional Knowledge in Renaissance Meteorology

Craig Martin
Early Science and Medicine
Vol. 14, No. 1/3, Evidence and Interpretation: Studies on Early Science and Medicine in Honor of John E. Murdoch (2009), pp. 265-289
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20617786
Page Count: 25
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($34.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Conjecture, Probabilism, and Provisional Knowledge in Renaissance Meteorology
Preview not available

Abstract

For Renaissance Aristotelian natural philosophers, ideally knowledge was certain and based on syllogistic demonstration. Many Italian scholars, such as Agostino Nifo, Pietro Pomponazzi, and Niccolò Cabeo, considered this ideal as inapplicable to the field of meteorology. Rather, because of the accidental nature of meteorological phenomena and the inherent irregularity of the weather, they believed that causal explanations of meteorology were largely conjectural, provisional, and probabilistic. Several of these natural philosophers applied the standard of "saving the appearances" to the field of meteorology because of the difficulties involved in making accurate observations. This lower epistemological standard contributed to the willingness of Aristotelians to revise meteorological theories and deviate from Aristotle's own positions.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[265]
    [265]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
266
    266
  • Thumbnail: Page 
267
    267
  • Thumbnail: Page 
268
    268
  • Thumbnail: Page 
269
    269
  • Thumbnail: Page 
270
    270
  • Thumbnail: Page 
271
    271
  • Thumbnail: Page 
272
    272
  • Thumbnail: Page 
273
    273
  • Thumbnail: Page 
274
    274
  • Thumbnail: Page 
275
    275
  • Thumbnail: Page 
276
    276
  • Thumbnail: Page 
277
    277
  • Thumbnail: Page 
278
    278
  • Thumbnail: Page 
279
    279
  • Thumbnail: Page 
280
    280
  • Thumbnail: Page 
281
    281
  • Thumbnail: Page 
282
    282
  • Thumbnail: Page 
283
    283
  • Thumbnail: Page 
284
    284
  • Thumbnail: Page 
285
    285
  • Thumbnail: Page 
286
    286
  • Thumbnail: Page 
287
    287
  • Thumbnail: Page 
288
    288
  • Thumbnail: Page 
289
    289