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Lobbying and Taxes
Brian Kelleher Richter, Krislert Samphantharak and Jeffrey F. Timmons
American Journal of Political Science
Vol. 53, No. 4 (Oct., 2009), pp. 893-909
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20647957
Page Count: 17
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Lobbying, Taxes, Effective tax rate, Political influence, Research and development, Business structures, Political science, Leverage, Politicians, Economic capital
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Lobbying dominates corporate political spending, but comprehensive studies of the benefits accrued are scarce. Using a dataset of all U.S. firms with publicly available financial statements, we delve into the tax benefits obtained from lobbying. Firms that spend more on lobbying in a given year pay lower effective tax rates in the next year. Increasing registered lobbying expenditures by 1% appears to lower effective tax rates by somewhere in the range of 0.5 to 1.6 percentage points for the average firm that lobbies. While individual firms amass considerable benefits, the costs of lobbying-induced tax breaks appear modest for the government.
American Journal of Political Science © 2009 Midwest Political Science Association