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Devisenmarktinterventionen im Flexkurssystem

Wolf Schäfer
Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft
Bd. 39, H. 3 (1988), pp. 385-393
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20714614
Page Count: 9
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Devisenmarktinterventionen im Flexkurssystem
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Abstract

In a flexible exchange rate system the exchange rate effects of official interventions in the foreign exchange markets are hardly predictable because there are several effects working. These effects (risk premium effect, interest differential effect, expectation effect) may intensify, diminish, or compensate each other so that the net effect is uncertain. This is especially true if official interventions embody „news” for the foreign exchange markets which is the case, e.g., if central banks' interventions are of no perceptible systematic manner. Only interventions on a systematic basis are predictable as regards their exchange rate effects because they are integratable in the exchange rates' expectation values. Therefore, central banks should intervene in the foreign exchange markets on the grounds of a consistent intertemporal intervention function which should be made public.

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