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SOCRATES ON HOW WRONGDOING DAMAGES THE SOUL

THOMAS C. BRICKHOUSE and NICHOLAS D. SMITH
The Journal of Ethics
Vol. 11, No. 4 (December, 2007), pp. 337-356
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20728514
Page Count: 20
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SOCRATES ON HOW WRONGDOING DAMAGES THE SOUL
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Abstract

There has been little scholarly attention given to explaining exactly how and why Socrates thinks that wrongdoing damages the soul. But there is more than a simple gap in the literature here, we shall argue. The most widely accepted view of Socratic moral psychology, we claim, actually leaves this well-known feature of Socrates' philosophy absolutely inexplicable. In the first section of this paper, we rehearse this view of Socratic moral psychology, and explain its inadequacy on the issue of the damaging consequences of wrongdoing. We then go on to provide our own account of the way in which injustice damages the soul, and then draw conclusions about how Socratic moral psychology should be understood.

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