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Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks
The American Political Science Review
Vol. 90, No. 1 (Mar., 1996), pp. 34-45
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082796
Page Count: 12
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Voting paradox, Majority voting, Juries, Signals, Voting, Voting behavior, Majority rule, Nash equilibrium, Aggregation, Political science
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The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the "better" of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred. Most extant proofs of this theorem implicitly make the behavioral assumption that individuals vote "sincerely" in the collective decision making, a seemingly innocuous assumption, given that individuals are taken to possess a common preference for selecting the better alternative. However, in the model analyzed here we find that sincere behavior by all individuals is not rational even when individuals have such a common preference. In particular, sincere voting does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. A satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably "do better" than individuals, therefore, has yet to be derived.
The American Political Science Review © 1996 American Political Science Association