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Positional Power, Strikes and Wages
Luca Perrone, Erik Olin Wright and Larry J. Griffin
American Sociological Review
Vol. 49, No. 3 (Jun., 1984), pp. 412-426
Published by: American Sociological Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095284
Page Count: 15
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Legitimate power, Labor strikes, Industrial products, Industrial market, Employment, Industrial production, Productivity, Industrial sectors, Political power, Economic systems
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Research on strikes has suffered from the lack of convincing measures of power which are operationally independent of the behaviors and outcomes such power is meant to explain. In particular, many discussions of strike behavior discuss the disruptive potential of strikes for the economy as a whole as an important structural basis of power, but such disruptive potential remains unmeasured. This paper proposes a strategy for measuring such disruptive potential using Leontief input-output matrices of intersectoral flows of commodities. The measure essentially taps the extent to which the cessation of production in one sector remains a purely local event or has ramifications throughout the economic structure. The empirical analysis of the paper then uses this measure to predict two outcomes: intersectoral wage differentials, and intersectoral strike behavior. The core results indicate that the measure of structural power predicts intersectoral wage differences extremely well but does not account for differences in strike propensities. The implications of these findings are then discussed in terms of the general problem of understanding the interconnections between power, strike behavior and wages.
American Sociological Review © 1984 American Sociological Association