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Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does the Timing of Contributions Matter?
The Review of Economics and Statistics
Vol. 77, No. 1 (Feb., 1995), pp. 127-136
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2109998
Page Count: 10
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Campaign contributions, Voting, Congressional voting, Legislators, Political action committees, Coefficients, Political campaigns, Voting behavior, Farm commodities, Farm economics
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Theoretical and empirical studies do not address whether campaign contributions from more than one election cycle are important for congressional voting behavior. Further, they do not address whether campaign contributions from different periods have different effects on legislative voting behavior. This paper analyzes the cumulative effect of campaign contributions over two time periods. Moreover, this paper studies the importance of the timing of contributions for legislative voting behavior. Ten roll call votes on price supports and quotas for various farm commodities in 1981 and 1985 are analyzed. Most of the estimated contribution coefficients are statistically significant. The results show that without campaign contributions farm interest would have lost in five of the seven votes that were won. Moreover, contributions that were given at approximately the same time as the vote have a larger impact on voting behavior than contributions that the legislator received one or two years prior to the vote.
The Review of Economics and Statistics © 1995 The MIT Press