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Counteractive Lobbying

David Austen-Smith and John R. Wright
American Journal of Political Science
Vol. 38, No. 1 (Feb., 1994), pp. 25-44
DOI: 10.2307/2111334
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111334
Page Count: 20
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Counteractive Lobbying
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Abstract

Since the 1960s, interest group scholars have suggested that groups mostly lobby legislators who, prior to lobbying, are expected to support their favored positions. We present theoretical and empirical evidence that, other things being equal, groups also lobby legislators who are predisposed to vote against their favored positions. We find that when groups lobby their ex ante supporters, they do so to counteract the influence of opposition groups. On the basis of our findings, we argue that organized interests play a much more prominent and substantial role in the legislative process than past research indicates.

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