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A Voting Model Implying Duverger's Law and Positive Turnout

Timothy J. Feddersen
American Journal of Political Science
Vol. 36, No. 4 (Nov., 1992), pp. 938-962
DOI: 10.2307/2111355
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111355
Page Count: 25
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
A Voting Model Implying Duverger's Law and Positive Turnout
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Abstract

This paper presents a model of costly voting under plurality rule that omits parties as strategic actors and implies Duverger's Law and positive turnout. The model demonstrates that strategic voting reduces the number of parties that receive votes under plurality rule to two or less while positive costs to vote increases the number to more than one. The two assumptions taken together lead to exactly two parties receiving votes.

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