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The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information
Jeffrey S. Banks and Barry R. Weingast
American Journal of Political Science
Vol. 36, No. 2 (May, 1992), pp. 509-524
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111488
Page Count: 16
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We analyze a model of interest group influence where this influence arises from a group's ability to provide relevant information to political actors about regulatory performance. The model rests on three premises: (1) bureaucrats possess an informational advantage, vis-a-vis their political overseers, concerning policy relevant variables; (2) this informational advantage is potentially exploitable by the agency; and (3) politicians anticipate this exploitation and adapt to it in their design of agencies. We show that a major consequence of this anticipation and adaptation is service to organized interest groups.
American Journal of Political Science © 1992 Midwest Political Science Association