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Presidential Control versus Bureaucratic Power: Explaining the Reagan Revolution in Antitrust

Marc Allen Eisner and Kenneth J. Meier
American Journal of Political Science
Vol. 34, No. 1 (Feb., 1990), pp. 269-287
DOI: 10.2307/2111519
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111519
Page Count: 19
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Presidential Control versus Bureaucratic Power: Explaining the Reagan Revolution in Antitrust
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Abstract

This analysis assesses the impact of the Reagan presidency on the antitrust policy of the Department of Justice. Explanations of policy change generated by the principal-agent and bureaucratic politics perspectives are tested using an interrupted time series model. The analysis reveals that the enforcement record of the 1980s did not reflect presidential or congressional politics but was the product of changes within the bureaucracy initiated well before the advent of the 1980 elections.

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