Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

Political Control and Policy Impact in EPA's Office of Water Quality

Evan J. Ringquist
American Journal of Political Science
Vol. 39, No. 2 (May, 1995), pp. 336-363
DOI: 10.2307/2111616
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111616
Page Count: 28
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Political Control and Policy Impact in EPA's Office of Water Quality
Preview not available

Abstract

The theory of overhead democracy is supplemented with theoretical insights from public administration to produce a more complete picture of bureaucratic decision making. Efforts at political control are less successful in altering agency goals, values, and the general direction of public policy than they are at altering bureaucratic outputs. Changes in bureaucratic activity over time depend upon external efforts at political control, agency resources, and the complexity and salience of the policy area. A series of multivariate transfer-function models is used to account for changes in EPA enforcement activity, total federal enforcement activity, and the expression of agency values in water-pollution control. Executive and legislative efforts at political control did reduce enforcement activity. However, these efforts were ineffective at altering agency values, less effective at EPA than in most other agencies, and less effective in water-pollution control than in other areas of EPA enforcement. They also mobilized EPA clientele to produce lower levels of political control in the long run.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[336]
    [336]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
337
    337
  • Thumbnail: Page 
338
    338
  • Thumbnail: Page 
339
    339
  • Thumbnail: Page 
340
    340
  • Thumbnail: Page 
341
    341
  • Thumbnail: Page 
342
    342
  • Thumbnail: Page 
343
    343
  • Thumbnail: Page 
344
    344
  • Thumbnail: Page 
345
    345
  • Thumbnail: Page 
346
    346
  • Thumbnail: Page 
347
    347
  • Thumbnail: Page 
348
    348
  • Thumbnail: Page 
349
    349
  • Thumbnail: Page 
[350]
    [350]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
351
    351
  • Thumbnail: Page 
352
    352
  • Thumbnail: Page 
353
    353
  • Thumbnail: Page 
354
    354
  • Thumbnail: Page 
355
    355
  • Thumbnail: Page 
356
    356
  • Thumbnail: Page 
357
    357
  • Thumbnail: Page 
358
    358
  • Thumbnail: Page 
359
    359
  • Thumbnail: Page 
360
    360
  • Thumbnail: Page 
361
    361
  • Thumbnail: Page 
362
    362
  • Thumbnail: Page 
363
    363