Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

Specialized Courts, Bureaucratic Agencies, and the Politics of U.S. Trade Policy

Wendy L. Hansen, Renee J. Johnson and Isaac Unah
American Journal of Political Science
Vol. 39, No. 3 (Aug., 1995), pp. 529-557
DOI: 10.2307/2111643
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111643
Page Count: 29
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Specialized Courts, Bureaucratic Agencies, and the Politics of U.S. Trade Policy
Preview not available

Abstract

The primary focus of our research is to investigate the role of specialized courts in the formation and implementation of public policy, focusing specifically on the Court of International Trade. Our theory focuses on the institutional relationships between specialized courts and their bureaucracies. We argue that expertise and oversight responsibilities of these courts play a central role in structuring their decision making. From this theory, we develop three main hypotheses: 1) specialized courts defer less to agency decisions than do generalist courts because of their expertise, 2) decisions from executive-level bureaucracies are more likely to be overturned by specialized courts than decisions from independent regulatory commissions, and 3) case-specific factors overwhelm political factors in explaining judicial behavior in specialized courts because judges on specialized courts face a strong constraint of stare decisis, resulting from a desire not to be overturned on appeal for both reputation and career enhancement reasons. The Court of International Trade's decisions to affirm or reverse bureaucratic policies are examined using probit analysis. We show that the Court of International Trade reverses decisions from an executive-level bureaucracy more frequently than those of an independent regulatory commission. However, while the court reverses over 40% of all agency decisions, thus having a seemingly substantial impact on policy outcomes, it does not appear to be pushing U.S. trade policy significantly in either a protectionist or nonprotectionist direction. Further, political influences on judges' decision making appear to be minor.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[529]
    [529]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
530
    530
  • Thumbnail: Page 
531
    531
  • Thumbnail: Page 
532
    532
  • Thumbnail: Page 
533
    533
  • Thumbnail: Page 
534
    534
  • Thumbnail: Page 
535
    535
  • Thumbnail: Page 
536
    536
  • Thumbnail: Page 
537
    537
  • Thumbnail: Page 
538
    538
  • Thumbnail: Page 
539
    539
  • Thumbnail: Page 
540
    540
  • Thumbnail: Page 
541
    541
  • Thumbnail: Page 
542
    542
  • Thumbnail: Page 
543
    543
  • Thumbnail: Page 
544
    544
  • Thumbnail: Page 
545
    545
  • Thumbnail: Page 
546
    546
  • Thumbnail: Page 
547
    547
  • Thumbnail: Page 
548
    548
  • Thumbnail: Page 
[549]
    [549]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
550
    550
  • Thumbnail: Page 
551
    551
  • Thumbnail: Page 
552
    552
  • Thumbnail: Page 
553
    553
  • Thumbnail: Page 
554
    554
  • Thumbnail: Page 
555
    555
  • Thumbnail: Page 
556
    556
  • Thumbnail: Page 
557
    557