Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

Political Parties and the Distribution of Federal Outlays

Steven D. Levitt and James M. Snyder, Jr.
American Journal of Political Science
Vol. 39, No. 4 (Nov., 1995), pp. 958-980
DOI: 10.2307/2111665
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111665
Page Count: 23
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Political Parties and the Distribution of Federal Outlays
Preview not available

Abstract

Several models of distributive politics predict a role for parties in determining the allocation of federal outlays. The number of Democratic voters will be positively correlated with federal outlays, even after controlling for demographic and socioeconomic variables. The degree to which a program will be skewed to Democrats will be a function of the amount of variation in program benefits across districts, whether the program is administered by formula, and the extent of one-party control when the program is initiated. Regression analysis of district-level data on election outcomes and federal assistance programs for the period 1984-90. The number of Democratic voters is an important predictor of the amount of federal dollars flowing to a district. Programs with a greater amount of variation across districts are more heavily skewed to Democrats, as are programs administered by formula. Programs initiated in the latter half of the 1970s, a time of solid Democratic control, exhibit the greatest bias towards Democrats; programs started in the Reagan era show no such bias. Our results are consistent with a model in which parties in the United States play an important, but limited role in determining the distribution of federal dollars: given enough time, parties can target types of voters, but they cannot easily target specific districts.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[958]
    [958]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
959
    959
  • Thumbnail: Page 
960
    960
  • Thumbnail: Page 
961
    961
  • Thumbnail: Page 
962
    962
  • Thumbnail: Page 
963
    963
  • Thumbnail: Page 
964
    964
  • Thumbnail: Page 
965
    965
  • Thumbnail: Page 
966
    966
  • Thumbnail: Page 
967
    967
  • Thumbnail: Page 
968
    968
  • Thumbnail: Page 
969
    969
  • Thumbnail: Page 
970
    970
  • Thumbnail: Page 
971
    971
  • Thumbnail: Page 
972
    972
  • Thumbnail: Page 
973
    973
  • Thumbnail: Page 
974
    974
  • Thumbnail: Page 
975
    975
  • Thumbnail: Page 
976
    976
  • Thumbnail: Page 
977
    977
  • Thumbnail: Page 
978
    978
  • Thumbnail: Page 
979
    979
  • Thumbnail: Page 
980
    980