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Alliance Duration and Democracy: An Extension and Cross-Validation of "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations"

William Reed
American Journal of Political Science
Vol. 41, No. 3 (Jul., 1997), pp. 1072-1078
DOI: 10.2307/2111689
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111689
Page Count: 7
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Alliance Duration and Democracy: An Extension and Cross-Validation of "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations"
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Abstract

Neoliberal institutionalism suggests that the international behavior of democracies differs from that of other regime types. This paper extends and cross-validates the empirical analyses in Gaubatz (1996). In the research update here, alliances are analyzed over the period 1815-1993. A discrete-time event history analysis (EHA) is employed to estimate the hazard rate. Validating Gaubatz's finding, the addition of democratic members to an alliance has a significant negative impact on the probability of alliance failure. This relationship exists even when controlling for the number of members in the alliance, the type of alliance, the number of major powers in the alliance, and periods of world war.

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