Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights

Stergios Skaperdas
The American Economic Review
Vol. 82, No. 4 (Sep., 1992), pp. 720-739
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2117341
Page Count: 20
  • Download ($10.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights
Preview not available

Abstract

This paper examines interaction in the absence of property rights when agents face a trade-off between productive and coercive activities. In this setting, conflict is not the necessary outcome of one-time interaction, and cooperation is consistent with domination of one agent over another. Other things being equal, an agent's power, a well-defined concept in this paper, is inversely related to an agent's resources when resources are valued according to marginal-productivity theory. Some implications for the evolution of property rights are drawn. The model is applicable to a variety of situations in which directly unproductive activities are prevalent.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
720
    720
  • Thumbnail: Page 
721
    721
  • Thumbnail: Page 
722
    722
  • Thumbnail: Page 
723
    723
  • Thumbnail: Page 
724
    724
  • Thumbnail: Page 
725
    725
  • Thumbnail: Page 
726
    726
  • Thumbnail: Page 
727
    727
  • Thumbnail: Page 
728
    728
  • Thumbnail: Page 
729
    729
  • Thumbnail: Page 
730
    730
  • Thumbnail: Page 
731
    731
  • Thumbnail: Page 
732
    732
  • Thumbnail: Page 
733
    733
  • Thumbnail: Page 
734
    734
  • Thumbnail: Page 
735
    735
  • Thumbnail: Page 
736
    736
  • Thumbnail: Page 
737
    737
  • Thumbnail: Page 
738
    738
  • Thumbnail: Page 
739
    739