Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Protection for Sale

Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman
The American Economic Review
Vol. 84, No. 4 (Sep., 1994), pp. 833-850
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118033
Page Count: 18
  • Download ($10.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Protection for Sale
Preview not available

Abstract

We develop a model in which special-interest groups make political contributions in order to influence an incumbent government's choice of trade policy. The interest groups bid for protection with their campaign support. Politicians maximize their own welfare, which depends on total contributions collected and on the welfare of voters. We study the structure of protection that emerges in the political equilibrium and the contributions by different lobbies that support the policy outcome. We also discuss why the lobbies may in some cases prefer to have the government use trade policy to transfer income, rather than more efficient means.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
833
    833
  • Thumbnail: Page 
834
    834
  • Thumbnail: Page 
835
    835
  • Thumbnail: Page 
836
    836
  • Thumbnail: Page 
837
    837
  • Thumbnail: Page 
838
    838
  • Thumbnail: Page 
839
    839
  • Thumbnail: Page 
840
    840
  • Thumbnail: Page 
841
    841
  • Thumbnail: Page 
842
    842
  • Thumbnail: Page 
843
    843
  • Thumbnail: Page 
844
    844
  • Thumbnail: Page 
845
    845
  • Thumbnail: Page 
846
    846
  • Thumbnail: Page 
847
    847
  • Thumbnail: Page 
848
    848
  • Thumbnail: Page 
849
    849
  • Thumbnail: Page 
850
    850