Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

The Swing Voter's Curse

Timothy J. Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
The American Economic Review
Vol. 86, No. 3 (Jun., 1996), pp. 408-424
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118204
Page Count: 17
  • Download ($10.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
The Swing Voter's Curse
Preview not available

Abstract

We analyze two-candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters. We demonstrate the existence of a swing voter's curse: less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless. The swing voter's curse leads to the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
408
    408
  • Thumbnail: Page 
409
    409
  • Thumbnail: Page 
410
    410
  • Thumbnail: Page 
411
    411
  • Thumbnail: Page 
412
    412
  • Thumbnail: Page 
413
    413
  • Thumbnail: Page 
414
    414
  • Thumbnail: Page 
415
    415
  • Thumbnail: Page 
416
    416
  • Thumbnail: Page 
417
    417
  • Thumbnail: Page 
418
    418
  • Thumbnail: Page 
419
    419
  • Thumbnail: Page 
420
    420
  • Thumbnail: Page 
421
    421
  • Thumbnail: Page 
422
    422
  • Thumbnail: Page 
423
    423
  • Thumbnail: Page 
424
    424