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Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?
The American Economic Review
Vol. 85, No. 4 (Sep., 1995), pp. 891-904
Published by: American Economic Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118238
Page Count: 14
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The persistence of cooperation in public-goods experiments has become an important puzzle for economists. This paper presents the first systematic attempt to separate the hypothesis that cooperation is due to kindness, altruism, or warm-glow from the hypothesis that cooperation is simply the result of errors or confusion. The experiment reveals that on average about half of all cooperation comes from subjects who understand free-riding but choose to cooperate out of some form of kindness. This suggests that the focus on errors and "learning" in experimental research should shift to include studies of preferences for cooperation as well.
The American Economic Review © 1995 American Economic Association