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Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives
Laurence R. Iannaccone
Journal of Political Economy
Vol. 100, No. 2 (Apr., 1992), pp. 271-291
Published by: University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138608
Page Count: 21
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Abstract
This paper presents an economic analysis of religious behavior that accounts for the continuing success of groups with strange requirements and seemingly inefficient prohibitions. The analysis does not presuppose any special motives for religious activity. Rather, religion is modeled as a club good that displays positive returns to "participatory crowding." The analysis demonstrates that efficient religions with perfectly rational members may benefit from stigma, self-sacrifice, and bizarre behavioral restrictions. The model also addresses sacrifice in nonreligious "social clubs": fraternities, communes, political parties, work groups, and families.
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Journal of Political Economy © 1992 University of Chicago Press