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A Theory of Focal Points
The Economic Journal
Vol. 105, No. 430 (May, 1995), pp. 533-550
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2235016
Page Count: 18
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Games, Focal points, Recommendations, Economic theory, Pure coordination games, Expected utility, Rational choice theory, Game theory, Peasant class, Linguistic scrambling
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The paper presents a theoretical framework which distinguishes between the strategic structure of a game (the `existential game') and the way the players describe the game to themselves. Each player works with a private description of the game, in which strategies are identified by labels; labels are generated by a stochastic labelling procedure. Each player chooses a decision rule which, for each possible private description, picks one of the available strategy labels. A criterion of collective rationality is applied to choices among decision rules. The implications of collective rationality are explored for a range of games with different labelling procedures.
The Economic Journal © 1995 Royal Economic Society