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The Philosophy of Multiple Comparisons

John W. Tukey
Statistical Science
Vol. 6, No. 1 (Feb., 1991), pp. 100-116
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2245714
Page Count: 17
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
The Philosophy of Multiple Comparisons
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Abstract

This paper is based on the 1989 Miller Memorial Lecture at Stanford University. The topic was chosen because of Rupert Miller's long involvement and significant contributions to multiple comparison procedures and theory. Our emphasis will be on the major questions that have received relatively little attention--on what one wants multiple comparisons to do, on why one wants to do that, and on how one can communicate the results. Very little attention will be given to how the results can be calculated--after all, there are books about that (e.g., Miller, 1966, 1981; Hochberg and Tamhane, 1987).

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