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Meaning, Use and Truth: On Whether a Use-Theory of Meaning Is Precluded by the Requirement that Whatever Constitutes the Meaning of a Predicate Be Capable of Determining the Set of Things of Which the Predicate is True and to Which It Ought to be Applied

Paul Horwich
Mind
New Series, Vol. 104, No. 414 (Apr., 1995), pp. 355-368
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2254795
Page Count: 14
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Meaning, Use and Truth: On Whether a Use-Theory of Meaning Is Precluded by the Requirement that Whatever Constitutes the Meaning of a Predicate Be Capable of Determining the Set of Things of Which the Predicate is True and to Which It Ought to be Applied
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