Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Context, Content, and Epistemic Transparency

Mahrad Almotahari and Ephraim Glick
Mind
Vol. 119, No. 476 (October 2010), pp. 1067-1086
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23012201
Page Count: 20
  • Download ($42.00)
  • Cite this Item
Context, Content, and Epistemic Transparency
Preview not available

Abstract

We motivate the idea that presupposition is a transparent attitude. We then explain why epistemic opacity is not a serious problem for Robert Stalnaker's theory of content and conversation. We conclude with critical remarks about John Hawthorne and Ofra Magidor's alternative theory.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[1067]
    [1067]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1068
    1068
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1069
    1069
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1070
    1070
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1071
    1071
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1072
    1072
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1073
    1073
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1074
    1074
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1075
    1075
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1076
    1076
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1077
    1077
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1078
    1078
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1079
    1079
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1080
    1080
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1081
    1081
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1082
    1082
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1083
    1083
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1084
    1084
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1085
    1085
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1086
    1086