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Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule

Salvador Barberà and Lars Ehlers
Social Choice and Welfare
Vol. 37, No. 4, Special issue in honor of Prasanta K. Pattanaik (October 2011), pp. 559-574
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23026322
Page Count: 16
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Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule
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Abstract

We study classes of voting situations where agents may exhibit a systematic inability to distinguish between the elements of certain sets of alternatives. These sets of alternatives may differ from voter to voter, thus resulting in personalized families of preferences. We study the properties of the majority relation when defined on restricted domains that are the cartesian product of preference families, each one reflecting the corresponding agent's objective indifferences, and otherwise allowing for all possible (strict) preference relations among alternatives. We present necessary and sufficient conditions on the preference domains of this type, guaranteeing that majority rule is quasi-transitive and thus the existence of Condorcet winners at any profile in the domain, and for any finite subset of alternatives. Finally, we compare our proposed restrictions with others in the literature, to conclude that they are independent of any previously discussed domain restriction.

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