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Making Rules about Rulemaking: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems
Christian B. Jensen and Robert J. McGrath
Political Research Quarterly
Vol. 64, No. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2011), pp. 656-667
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23056383
Page Count: 12
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Parliamentary system, Separation of powers, Government bureaucracy, Political partisanship, Administrative law, Administrative agencies, Democracy, Political research, Veto
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The authors examine the administrative procedures acts (APAs) of separation of powers and parliamentary systems. They examine sixteen national APAs (thirteen parliamentary and three presidential) and forty-eight APAs from the U.S. states that have institutional structures analogous to the presidential systems. They identify a very stark difference between the parliamentary and presidential APAs. While all of the presidential system APAs place constraints on both adjudicative and rulemaking activities, only two of the parliamentary APAs make any reference to rulemaking at all. The authors present an institutional explanation for this observation based on recent work on veto players and delegated discretion to administrative agents. They argue that the presence of partisan veto players discourages focus on rulemaking in APAs.
Political Research Quarterly © 2011 University of Utah