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The Effect of Voluntary Sell-Off Announcements on Shareholder Wealth
Prem C. Jain
The Journal of Finance
Vol. 40, No. 1 (Mar., 1985), pp. 209-224
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2328056
Page Count: 16
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Shareholders, Stock prices, Financial economics, Finance, Wall Street, Wealth, Capital structure, Common stock, Stock sales, Business structures
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Sell-off activities arise when a firm sells part of its assets (e.g., a segment, a division, etc.) but continues to exist in essentially the same form. This study investigates the effect of voluntary sell-offs on stock returns. From a sample of over 1000 sell-off events (first public announcements), the evidence shows that both sellers and buyers earn significant positive excess returns from these transactions. The excess returns earned by buyers are smaller than those earned by sellers. There is also evidence that sell-off announcements are preceded by a period of significant negative returns for the sellers which suggests that the sellers, on average, performed poorly prior to their sell-off activities.
The Journal of Finance © 1985 American Finance Association