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Heidegger's Transcendent Nothing / האין הטרנסצנדנטי של היידגר
גבריאל מוצקין and Gabriel Motzkin
Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly / עיון: רבעון פילוסופי
כרך ל"ח, חוברת א (טבת תשמ"ט), pp. 25-40
Published by: S. H. Bergman Center for Philosophical Studies
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23349899
Page Count: 16
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This paper analyses Heidegger's concept of transcendence in terms of his making possibility prior to actuality and his rejection of any notion of immanence. Heidegger seeks to show how the meaninggiving activity of transcending to a world and the notion of absolute transcendence can be thought together without recourse to the idea that what is transcendent must become immanent. The assimilation of possibility to the notion of world and the rejection of immanence imply that nothingness is not merely the absence of substance. Instead, Heidegger uses the concept of the Nothing to explain how worlds are made or "created" in relation to the Nothing. Hence his concept of the Nothing is that of a transcendent Nothing. Heidegger needs a transcendent rather than an immanent Nothing because of his ontological dualism which distinguishes meaning from physical being.
Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly / עיון: רבעון פילוסופי © 1989 S. H. Bergman Center for Philosophical Studies