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The Indispensability Argument for Mathematical Realism and Scientific Realism

Jacob Busch
Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie
Vol. 43, No. 1 (July 2012), pp. 3-9
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23353745
Page Count: 7
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Abstract

Confirmational holism is central to a traditional formulation of the indispensability argument for mathematical realism (IA). I argue that recent strategies for defending scientific realism are incompatible with confirmational holism. Thus a traditional formulation of IA is incompatible with recent strategies for defending scientific realism. As a consequence a traditional formulation of IA will only have limited appeal.

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