Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics

Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler
The Journal of Business
Vol. 59, No. 4, Part 2: The Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory (Oct., 1986), pp. S285-S300
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2352761
Page Count: 16
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($14.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics
Preview not available

Abstract

The traditional assumption that fairness is irrelevant to economic analysis is questioned. Even profit-maximizing firms will have an incentive to act in a manner that is perceived as fair if the individuals with whom they deal are willing to resist unfair transactions and punish unfair firms at some cost to themselves. Three experiments demonstrated that willingness to enforce fairness is common. Community standards for actions affecting customers, tenants, and employees were studied in telephone surveys. The rules of fairness, some of which are not obvious, help explain some anomalous market phenomena.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
S285
    S285
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S286
    S286
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S287
    S287
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S288
    S288
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S289
    S289
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S290
    S290
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S291
    S291
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S292
    S292
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S293
    S293
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S294
    S294
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S295
    S295
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S296
    S296
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S297
    S297
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S298
    S298
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S299
    S299
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S300
    S300