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Plural situational logic: the rationa(lisabi)lity principle

Celia Lessa Kerstenetzky
Cambridge Journal of Economics
Vol. 33, No. 2 (March 2009), pp. 193-209
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23601798
Page Count: 17
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Plural situational logic: the rationa(lisabi)lity principle
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Abstract

In the context of a critique of the exclusive use of the rational choice approach in economics, the article presents a pluralistic interpretation of the Popperian notion of situational logic as an alternative approach. This is proposed in connection with a reading of the rationality principle as a rationalisability principle. I argue that this principle can accommodate an ample array of rational responses to different situations and even rationalise the multiple responses that are given to the same situation. I present some examples to illustrate the relevance of the proposed interpretation.

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