Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Corruption, institutions, and economic development

Toke S. Aidt
Oxford Review of Economic Policy
Vol. 25, No. 2, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT (SUMMER 2009), pp. 271-291
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23607049
Page Count: 21
  • Download ($42.00)
  • Cite this Item
Corruption, institutions, and economic development
Preview not available

Abstract

Many scholarly articles on corruption give the impression that the world is populated by two types of people: the 'sanders' and the 'greasers'. The 'sanders' believe that corruption is an obstacle to development, while the 'greasers' believe that corruption can (in some cases) foster development. This paper takes a critical look at these positions. It concludes that the evidence supporting the 'greasing the wheels hypothesis' is very weak and shows that there is no correlation between a new measure of managers' actual experience with corruption and GDP growth. Instead, the paper uncovers a strong negative correlation between growth in genuine wealth per capita—a direct measure of sustainable development—and corruption. While corruption may have little average effect on the growth rate of GDP per capita, it is a likely source of unsustainable development.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[271]
    [271]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
272
    272
  • Thumbnail: Page 
273
    273
  • Thumbnail: Page 
274
    274
  • Thumbnail: Page 
275
    275
  • Thumbnail: Page 
276
    276
  • Thumbnail: Page 
277
    277
  • Thumbnail: Page 
278
    278
  • Thumbnail: Page 
279
    279
  • Thumbnail: Page 
280
    280
  • Thumbnail: Page 
281
    281
  • Thumbnail: Page 
282
    282
  • Thumbnail: Page 
283
    283
  • Thumbnail: Page 
284
    284
  • Thumbnail: Page 
285
    285
  • Thumbnail: Page 
286
    286
  • Thumbnail: Page 
287
    287
  • Thumbnail: Page 
288
    288
  • Thumbnail: Page 
289
    289
  • Thumbnail: Page 
290
    290
  • Thumbnail: Page 
291
    291