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Karl Christian Friedrich Krause und das ‚gute Recht‘

Claus Dierksmeier
ARSP: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy
Vol. 85, No. 1 (1999), pp. 75-94
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23680369
Page Count: 20
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Karl Christian Friedrich Krause und das ‚gute Recht‘
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Abstract

The article examines the legal philosophy of Karl Christian Friedrich Krause, a German philosopher whose work was recognised namely in the Hispanic world. It tries to show the remaining relevance of his philosophy of law. The article is divided into three parts. In the first chapter Krause's life and work are reported. The following chapter gives a short overview of his legal philosophy and especially its modern postulates. In order to explain the inner structure of argumentation from which these postulates arise, the third chapter reports aspects from Krause's metaphysical system. Approximately, one may say that Krause tries to adapt Kant's transcendental method without its formalistic results. He suggests an ontology of the good as a corrective principle. On the basis of a philosophy of the absolute which he uses to ground transcendental philosophy in general he derives a theory of the good right in particular, which is the inner sense of his critic as well as positive concept of law and justice. The good right — this is the crucial point making his theory suitable for modern thinking — is one that finds its concrete forms only by transforming freedom into rules. But freedom, Krause insists, can not be positively installed without a positive orientation on concepts of good and of the good itself. This orientation therefore has to be recognised and reflected by the legal institutions.

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