Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

Norms, Rationality, and Communication: A Reputation Theory of Social Norms

Andreas Engert
ARSP: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy
Vol. 92, No. 3 (2006), pp. 335-362
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23681602
Page Count: 28
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Norms, Rationality, and Communication: A Reputation Theory of Social Norms
Preview not available

Abstract

I attempt to explain social norms without relying on behavioral constraints (like habit) and normative motivations (like altruism). Instead, the reputation theory of social norms proposed here analyzes norms as mere social constructs: In strategic situations, rationality fails to provide clear guidance on how to act. Because individuals need to make decisions, they follow norms. Yet norms are subject to strategic manipulation; players can try to upset them by promoting alternative norm proposals. Two factors stabilize norms against this threat: network effects and preference compatibility. At the same time, they favor norms that foster cooperation among individuals as well as norms that overcome collective action problems. The reputation theory of social norms thus may help to resolve one of the anomalies of rational choice analysis — the fact that collective action exists.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[335]
    [335]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
336
    336
  • Thumbnail: Page 
337
    337
  • Thumbnail: Page 
338
    338
  • Thumbnail: Page 
339
    339
  • Thumbnail: Page 
340
    340
  • Thumbnail: Page 
341
    341
  • Thumbnail: Page 
342
    342
  • Thumbnail: Page 
343
    343
  • Thumbnail: Page 
344
    344
  • Thumbnail: Page 
345
    345
  • Thumbnail: Page 
346
    346
  • Thumbnail: Page 
347
    347
  • Thumbnail: Page 
348
    348
  • Thumbnail: Page 
349
    349
  • Thumbnail: Page 
350
    350
  • Thumbnail: Page 
351
    351
  • Thumbnail: Page 
352
    352
  • Thumbnail: Page 
353
    353
  • Thumbnail: Page 
354
    354
  • Thumbnail: Page 
355
    355
  • Thumbnail: Page 
356
    356
  • Thumbnail: Page 
357
    357
  • Thumbnail: Page 
358
    358
  • Thumbnail: Page 
359
    359
  • Thumbnail: Page 
360
    360
  • Thumbnail: Page 
361
    361
  • Thumbnail: Page 
362
    362