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Coordinated Effects in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines

Wayne-Roy Gayle, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx and Jean-François Richard
Review of Industrial Organization
Vol. 39, No. 1/2 (August 2011), pp. 39-56
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23885235
Page Count: 18
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Coordinated Effects in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
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Abstract

Recent research has highlighted the quantitative contribution to merger analysis from extending unilateral effects models to understand the payoffs to future potential coordinated effects. Some of the emphasis of this research appears to have made its way into the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. In this paper, we demonstrate the quantification of coordinated effects in an oligopoly and procurement model, and we show that screens that are based on upward pricing pressure are not adequate in mergers where coordinated effects are a potential concern.

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