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Construction and "Worldmaking": the Significance of Nelson Goodman's Pluralism
Xavier de Donato-Rodríguez
Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
SEGUNDA EPOCA, Vol. 24, No. 2(65) (May 2009), pp. 213-225
Published by: University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23923828
Page Count: 13
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Pluralist school, Philosophical realism, Constructivism, Observational frames of reference, Metaphysics, Philosophy of science, Radiation counters, Natural kinds, Concept of being, Theoretical linguistics
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Goodman's style may be elusive sometimes, so that it may result difficult to interpret what he really has in mind. This is a consequence of his masterful use of irony and metaphorical language. This difficulty of interpretation affects important parts of his philosophical thoughts and had led to misunderstandings. In the present article, I discuss the significance of Goodman's pluralism, one of his most relevant theses. I try to show that Goodman's pluralism does not lead to skepticism or the relativism of "anything goes". One of the most common arguments directed against Goodman's pluralism is that his attempt to provide a genuine standard of "rightness" fails, leaving us without a conception of truth or an appropriate substitute. I will argue that the conclusion of this argument is false, trying to show that Goodman's aim of defending an irrealist pluralism is perfectly coherent and defensible against the common interpretation of his critics.
Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science © 2009 University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU)