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Play for Pay: Effects of Inequity in a Pay-for-Performance Context
Joseph W. Harder
Administrative Science Quarterly
Vol. 37, No. 2, Special Issue: Process and Outcome: Perspectives on the Distribution of Rewards in Organizations (Jun., 1992), pp. 321-335
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2393227
Page Count: 15
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Baseball, Basketball, Expectancy theory, Arbitration, Professional sports, Baseball statistics, Pay for performance, Salary, Motivation research, Industrial and organizational psychology
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This research explores the effects of an objectively determined, continuous measure of inequity on composite measures of individual performance in a pay-for-performance context, professional baseball and basketball. It was hypothesized that pay-for-performance contingencies would lessen the effects of individual underreward on individual performance. In addition, it was hypothesized that individual underreward would lead to less cooperative and more selfish behavior. Regression models of performance were run, controlling for prior career performance. The effects of the continuous measure of inequity on performance were greater for overrewarded individuals than for underrewarded individuals. Furthermore, underrewarded individuals behaved less cooperatively and more selfishly, while overrewarded individuals behaved more cooperatively.
Administrative Science Quarterly © 1992 Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University