Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

A Model of Incentives for the Illegal Exploitation of Black Rhinos and Elephants: Poaching Pays in Luangwa Valley, Zambia

E. J. Milner-Gulland and N. Leader-Williams
Journal of Applied Ecology
Vol. 29, No. 2 (1992), pp. 388-401
DOI: 10.2307/2404508
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2404508
Page Count: 14
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($18.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
A Model of Incentives for the Illegal Exploitation of Black Rhinos and Elephants: Poaching Pays in Luangwa Valley, Zambia
Preview not available

Abstract

1. The decline of Africa's rhinos and elephants over the past decade has alarmed conservationists, yet little is known about the interaction between law enforcement and the economic incentives for illegal exploitation. This study models the relationships between financial gains, detection and penalties for poaching rhinos and elephants in Luangwa Valley, Zambia during 1979-85. 2. We explore how sentencing strategies affect the decisions of poachers in relation to changes in detection rate, penalty and economic variables. We show that a penalty which varies with the output of a poacher is, in theory, a more effective tool against poaching than a fixed penalty. However, the probability of capture is a highly significant factor in the poacher's decision to hunt. 3. The incentives to poach are modelled for an open access situation, the industry structure for a local poacher, and for a monopolist who employs organized gangs. Organized and local gangs have very different reactions to law enforcement. Local poachers will respond to local investment schemes, but the deterrence of organized gangs can only be achieved with improved law enforcement operations.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
388
    388
  • Thumbnail: Page 
389
    389
  • Thumbnail: Page 
390
    390
  • Thumbnail: Page 
391
    391
  • Thumbnail: Page 
392
    392
  • Thumbnail: Page 
393
    393
  • Thumbnail: Page 
394
    394
  • Thumbnail: Page 
395
    395
  • Thumbnail: Page 
396
    396
  • Thumbnail: Page 
397
    397
  • Thumbnail: Page 
398
    398
  • Thumbnail: Page 
399
    399
  • Thumbnail: Page 
400
    400
  • Thumbnail: Page 
401
    401