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Public Trust in Investment Banking
Ivo G. Caytas
Vol. 43, No. 3 (1989), pp. 150-158
Published by: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/24179826
Page Count: 9
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Given the fact that investment banking operates at the epicenter of the allocation of financial assets, it has to steer a balanced course betwee the preservation of public trust and the paralysis of market-oriented risk-taking: regulation, self-restraint, peer control and public disclosure are the centerpieces of a mechanism that both drives and slows financial innovation. Before long, decisions will have to be made as to whose interests are to prevail in market situations that preclude the accomodation of the positions of all parties involved. With the advent of a new administration in the United States, it may soon appear that re-regulation of securities markets is not nearly as much in conflict with the conservative agenda as it seemed during the Reagan years – all prompted by the insight that daunting choices cannot be avoided forever, and a healthy market is essential to any solution conceivable.
Die Unternehmung © 1989 Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH